Request a section.
The recognised holder requests fresh access. The experimental mechanism checks current eligibility and requires sufficient valid contributions bound to the recipient.
01 / Digital scarcity
A possession that can
change hands.
INTEGYRS explores a precise question: when a recognised possession moves to someone else, can the system make fresh access follow the new holder?
Three things that need to work together.
The ownership layer recognises a possession and its current controller. The access layer decides whether a request is eligible. The device layer determines where keys, plaintext and displayed content can actually be protected.
The current alpha connects the first two in bounded software and private-node experiments. Device-level scarcity is the broader engineering goal. It requires a verified protected endpoint.
Understand the layersExplore the sequence
From A to B,
one step at a time.
Choose a stage to see the intended ownership and access relationship. This synthetic illustration runs only in your browser. It is not a live transaction or a secure reader.
ENDPOINT AFresh access eligible
ENDPOINT BNo fresh access
STEP 01 / 03
Create a recognised possession.
Endpoint A is the recognised holder. A fresh request can be authorised in this illustrative state. The encrypted content remains separate from the ownership record.
Ownership: A recognised; no transfer pending
Access: A may request a new section
Define the cut-off.
Freeze-first denies new seller authorization and retained, unconsumed capability use. A receipt committed before freeze can still be delivered afterward.
Check the successor.
The new holder becomes eligible under the required state policy. The previous holder’s later access is refused. Already disclosed plaintext cannot be recalled.
First proposed use case
A small publication.
A meaningful transfer.
Start with a short, rights-cleared digital publication split into sections. One holder accesses it, transfers the recognised possession, and the next holder requests a section.
The proposed pilot uses two approved test endpoints, no resale payments and no sensitive documents. It would measure successful access, correct refusals, recovery and whether the experience makes sense to people.
See the pilot gateCommon questions
Be precise about
what changes.
Ownership recognition, content licensing and protection from copying are separate questions. Future product terms must make those differences clear.
Can a copy still exist?
Yes. Encrypted bytes, previously disclosed plaintext, photographs and transcription can exist. The program concerns recognised possession and controlled fresh access. Stronger device claims require a demonstrated protected boundary.
Can the possession be transferred today?
The alpha exercises transfer in software and on an isolated private node. A production end-to-end service and public-network settlement have not been demonstrated.
What happens to an already-open section?
The software model has a precise authorization cut-off, but it does not demonstrate continuous protected display control. An already-authorized delivery may finish after freeze, and previously displayed plaintext cannot be erased remotely.
What if a device or key is lost?
The software model exercises device replacement while owner authority survives. Losing the sole owner signing key is unrecoverable in the present profile. A safe production recovery design remains a roadmap gate.
Does it work offline?
No. The current alpha requires fresh authenticated state observations and does not work offline. Later off-chain proofs and verification mechanisms are planned research; they do not establish a working offline mode today. Any future offline policy needs its own tested threat model.
Does possession include copyright?
No. The current alpha does not implement copyright management or copyright transfer. It models system-recognised possession and access. Rights in the underlying work are a separate question requiring explicit licensing terms and content-owner permission. This limitation is separate from the alpha’s lack of offline access.
A small glossary
Useful terms, plain meanings.
- Possession
- A uniquely recognised state in the system, with a current controller and an explicit succession rule.
- Entitlement
- Permission to perform a defined action, such as requesting a section under a stated policy.
- Capability
- A bounded authorization that the recipient can present for an access operation.
- Epoch
- A version or period used to distinguish current authorization state from an earlier state.
- Threshold
- The minimum number of valid contributions required for a protected access step.
- Confirmation
- Evidence that a transaction is included under the selected chain and settlement policy.
Beyond file copying
Transfer authority.
Constrain a fresh use.
A normal file transfer gives the recipient another copy while the sender may keep a usable original. A recognised digital possession changes which current authority can obtain a permitted new use. Encrypted bytes may stay replicated; a retained copy need not confer current access.
The information-security ambition is least-privilege disclosure: a specific unit, operation, endpoint and state, rather than a full plaintext document handed to an ordinary application. In future hardware, the complete work should never be assembled as plaintext; only the authorised bounded working set should exist.
This could support lending, secondary transfer, controlled enterprise information, device entitlements or licensed computations. Each requires its own rights, output policy, recovery and threat model. The alpha currently provides software-model lifecycle behavior, not those complete commercial offerings.
Read the deep explanation of digital scarcity and information security →